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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the decisions of contestants on the TV game show Deal or No Deal to 
attempt to observe any evidence of differing levels of risk aversion under losses and gains 
as predicted by prospect theory. The results reveal some evidence of decreased risk 
aversion in the domains of losses and gains, with contestants displaying behavior 
consistent with the break-even and house-money effects. We conclude there may be 
enough evidence of variable reference points to warrant further investigation, and propose 
suggestions for further research. 
Key words: Decision making under uncertainty, behavioral economics, behavioral finance, 
biases, heuristics, Prospect Theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Human attitudes towards risk have always played their part in the decision-making 
process. The St. Petersburg paradox first described by Bernoulli in 1713 arises when dealing 
with infinite expected monetary values, ultimately suggesting that expected-wealth maximizing 
individuals would pay an infinite amount of money to take a gamble with a very low probability of 
receiving an infinite amount in return. The solution to this paradox led to the first formulation of 
expected utility theory (EUT) in 1738 by Daniel Bernoulli (1954). The essence of Bernoulli’s 
solution introduced the concepts of a utility function and of diminishing marginal utility, ensuring 
that even gambles with an infinite expected value have a finite expected utility. 
The theory was used as the foundations for further research into attitudes towards 
gambles, leading to the development of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). This formulation incorporated the inherent risk aversion 
typically exhibited by individuals and was adopted by economists. 
Since then, the shortcomings of EUT have repeatedly been highlighted by various 
studies, with the use of linear probability weighting functions (Allais, 1953) and the inability of the 
theory to provide a plausible account of risk aversion over moderate stakes (Arrow, 1971) 
prompting criticism and development. The effects that framing can have on a decision-maker 
prove that individuals consider more than simply the objective features of a gamble (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). Whilst EUT can explain some risk aversion over very large stakes, its scope 
is limited to these very specific scenarios. 
The anomaly of risk aversion within the EUT framework has been studied in depth (Rabin 
& Thaler, 2001). It has been proposed that prospect theory (PT) better describes individuals’ 
attitudes towards risk due to the incorporation of loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Tests run within the paper show that individuals will often reject moderate stakes gambles when 
faced with an equal chance of winning £x or losing £x, implying the utility function of gains and 
losses is not symmetrical. Furthermore, the origin represents the reference point for an 
individual, the relative location of which varies over time and circumstance. PT incorporates 
these important differences into its model. In addition, this increased sensitivity to losses relative 
to gains can see an increase or decrease in risk-seeking behavior when evaluating gambles, 
depending on the location of the individual’s reference point. 
This paper will study contestant decisions in Deal or No Deal, TV game show. From 
here, it will attempt to identify any evidence of contestants exhibiting an increase in risk-seeking 
behavior when operating in the domain of losses (DoL), and/or a decrease in risk-seeking 
behavior when operating in the domain of gains (DoG). The definitions of each domain will be 
clearly defined in section 3 of the paper. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature, introducing the game show and exploring the findings of any similar studies. 
Additionally, we expand on the nature and implications of prospect theory, as well as detailing 
the various underlying psychological biases applicable to this study. Section 3 details the 
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methodology and data analyzed. Additionally, contestants’ utilities about different prize amounts 
are modelled, and various coefficients are developed in an attempt to quantify the risk of 
accepting a gamble. Section 4 presents the results and analysis with reference to noticeable 
differences in behavior between domains. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Deal Or No Deal And Similar Studies 
Conceived in the Netherlands, Deal or No Deal’s popularity has seen it spread to various 
countries around the world, although the format has remained largely the same. This paper will 
use the UK version of the game. Whilst various studies have used other game shows to 
measure risk attitudes (Beetsma & Schotman, 2001; Gertner, 1993; Hartley et al., 2013), Deal or 
No Deal is unique in terms of its structure and rules, and provides the perfect environment in 
which to examine decision-making under uncertainty. The lack of any quiz-type elements 
significantly reduces the effect intelligence has on the prosperity of a contestant’s game, in turn 
increasing the significance of good fortune. It can be postulated that dealing with pressure and 
managing to overcome greed and psychological biases are the most important skills a 
contestant can have, to ensure a consistent and considered decision-making process is followed 
when required. 
The standard2 game consists of 22 numbered boxes, each with a value hidden inside, 
from 1p to £250,000. A contestant selects a box, which becomes their box for the rest of the 
game. They then proceed to open the remaining boxes one by one, thus eliminating values from 
the game. After five boxes have been opened, an individual known as “the banker” contacts the 
contestant and makes an offer for the contestant’s box. The contestant can choose to accept 
(deal) or reject (no deal) this offer. The banker will then make another offer after every three 
boxes opened thereafter. If the contestant removes high value boxes, the banker’s offer 
decreases, reflecting a drop in the expected value of the contestant’s box, and vice versa. As 
such a contestant wishes to open only low value boxes up until the point they choose the deal, 
and subsequently only open high value boxes. This ideal scenario sees the contestant choose 
to deal at the highest possible offer, before eventually with luck having an amount in their box 
lower than or equal to the value at which they dealt. If a player elects to stay in the game until 
the very end, they are presented with a final choice, which is to “Swap” or “No Swap”. This 
refers to swapping their box with the one remaining box left in play, claiming the contents of this 
box as a prize instead. 
                                                          
2 Whilst Deal or No Deal in the UK has a standard format outlined in this section, the show does occasionally 
see deviations from this format, often themed to coincide with various holiday seasons. For sake of 
consistency and accuracy, this paper will only use data from episodes that used the standard format. 
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Various phenomena have been observed by a previous study conducted into decision-
making within Deal or No Deal (Post et al., 2008). In this study, a contestant on the Dutch3 
edition of the show named Frank had a particularly unlucky run of boxes before removing the 
largest remaining value of €500,000. This saw the expected value of his box to drop from 
€102,006 to €2508. Frank went on to reject all subsequent offers, the last of which was 120% of 
the expected value. This increase in risk-seeking behavior is consistent with the break-even 
effect, with Frank attempting to recoup some of his losses. An elegant example of an increasing 
Risk appetite in loss. 
The same paper explored the game of Susanne, a contestant on the German edition of 
the game. Susanne, contrary to Frank, had a particularly fortunate run of boxes and was left with 
€100,000 and €150,000 in play. She rejected an offer of €125,000, instead choosing to gamble 
on and ultimately won the larger amount of €150,000. This was despite the banker offer being 
100% of the expected value, 2% higher than the average amount offered by the banker at the 
same stage of the game to other contestants categorized as “winners”. This was behavior 
representative of the house-money effect, or an increase in risk-seeking behavior due to the 
sensation of playing with someone else’s money. This is due to the fact that Susanne would still 
feel like a winner even if she won the minimum amount possible (€100,000). 
The break-even effect exhibited by Frank is consistent with the predictions of Kahneman 
and Tversky, as if Frank’s reference point had been the expected value of his box or the largest 
offer so far, removing the €500,000 would certainly place Frank in the domain of losses and 
would incite risk-seeking behavior. Interestingly however, Susanne’s display of risk-seeking 
behavior is not in line with the predictions of prospect theory, which suggests increased risk 
aversion in the domain of gains. It is argued by the paper that both the break-even and house-
money effects are examples of individuals failing to completely adapt to prior losses and gains. It 
may also be the case that Susanne is an extremely risk-seeking person, and when operating in 
the domain of gains at the end did display an increase in risk aversion, relative to her behavior in 
earlier rounds.  
It has been suggested that certain industries attract individuals with a higher risk 
tolerance (Nguyen & Leung, 2009). As such, contestants on Deal or No Deal, whilst 
heterogeneous about their specific risk preferences, can perhaps be assumed to be less risk-
averse than their non-contestant counterparts. This may have important implications within the 
construct of this study, and as a result it will not necessarily be possible to generalize any 
findings of this study to individuals in the wider world. 
                                                          
3 The Dutch version of the show is different, in that it is played over nine rounds and there is considerably more 
money at stake. 
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2.2 Prospect Theory And Psychological Biases 
The introduction of prospect theory in 1979 introduced new concepts that are intuitively 
easy to understand yet could not be explained by EUT. The first of these was the idea that 
individuals evaluate their situation or choices around some reference point and do not associate 
utility with absolute values of wealth, but rather with gains and losses around this reference 
point. This reference point can be the status quo, but occasionally might be expected gains or 
losses. The idea of a variable reference point is described by the following example. 
Two individuals, Alex and Beth, possess equivalent initial wealth. Alex takes a gamble 
with a 99% chance of winning £100,000 and a 1% chance of winning nothing. Beth takes a 
gamble with a 1% chance of winning £100,000 and a 99% chance of winning nothing. Both 
gambles are risk free, in that nothing can be lost. According to EUT, therefore, no utility can be 
lost, and everyone would be expected to take the gamble. If neither gamble wins however, it’s 
fair to assume that Alex will be more disappointed than Beth. This is indicative of Alex effectively 
setting up a new reference point for himself due to the overwhelming odds of winning the 
gamble (Kahneman, 2011). 
As such, a Deal or No Deal contestant’s reference point may take on multiple values, not 
only between subjects but over the course of an individual’s game. These values could match 
initial hopes/expectations, the highest offer received so far or the estimated expected value of 
the contestant’s box. It could also be the case that as with the preceding example contestants 
doing particularly well or poorly tentatively set up new reference points for themselves according 
to how they think they’re likely to do. The position of the reference point must be known to 
determine whether contestants are operating in the domains of losses and gains, and thus will 
be clearly defined in section 3. 
 
Whilst prospect theory’s contribution of evaluating gambles with regards to losses and 
gains about a reference point was undoubtedly an important one to the study of decision-making 
under uncertainty, the theory was not without its limitations. The original paper’s choice 
problems posed to test subjects were hypothetical situations using moderate amounts in which 
no money was really ever going to be won or lost. Evidence since has shown that whilst risk 
aversion increases sharply as real potential gains or losses increase (Bosch-Domènech & 
Silvestre, 1999), the same cannot be said for hypothetical scenarios (Holt & Laury, 2002). 
Furthermore, psychological stress has been shown to impede the decision-making process 
(Keinan, 1987). With TV cameras, life-changing amounts of money, time constraints and the 
knowledge that a contestant probably has just one opportunity to play the game4, there is strong 
evidence to support that Deal or No Deal is an extremely stressful environment. 
                                                          
4 Whilst unverified, no individuals ever played the UK version of the game show more than once, to the 
author’s knowledge. 
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With rational decision-making expected to be affected then, the importance and 
prominence of various psychological biases may enter into play. Biases can be categorized as 
either cognitive or emotional (Pompian, 2012). Cognitive biases are “basic statistical, information 
processing or memory errors that can deviate from rationality”, whereas emotional biases are 
those that “arise spontaneously as a result of attitudes and feelings”. Whilst many biases could 
perhaps be observed within the Deal or No Deal framework, the primary purpose of this paper is 
to identify any evidence of an increase or decrease in risk-seeking behavior, and not to explain 
speculate on biases that may be driving these changes. As such, this section discusses only 
those biases that link strongly to the topics already discussed. 
The gambler’s fallacy is a cognitive bias, which occurs as a result of individuals 
misunderstanding the nature of chance. It has been demonstrated that individuals who see a 
roulette wheel show red a few times sequentially erroneously believe that a black is due to 
show, and place an increased probability of this occurring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A 
contestant on Deal or No Deal experiencing the same illusion may believe that a more forgiving 
round than perhaps the odds would dictate should follow an all-red round (unlucky). A 
contestant with a strong enough conviction in this fallacy may have their decision affected when 
considering the banker offer. This is a key example of probability matching Koehler & James 
(2009). 
The illusion of control bias is the notion that individuals like to believe they have more 
control over uncertain events than they actually do. This is shown by contestants regularly 
choosing boxes in some order that has some personal significance to them. Placing 
exaggerated importance on the order in which boxes are opened can place additional pressure 
on a contestant, and as discussed earlier, pressure most frequently has a negative impact on 
the decision-making process. A way to prevent this from happening would be to choose a 
random order, or even just to open boxes sequentially. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The data examined has been obtained from two sources. The first dataset has been 
obtained from the official Deal or No Deal website, and contains very general information 
relating to the games of 1686 contestants from January 2006 to December 2011. The second 
dataset has been created by the author from detailed reports of the games of 20 random5 
individuals from the first dataset, and contains much more information relating to the paths taken 
by contestants through the game. These reports were available freely online via a website 
created by fans of the game show. 
The first dataset is to be analyzed to provide a general overview of the sample. This 
includes finding out various means and medians relating to the different variables, and 
establishing whether or not the majority of contestants beat the banker6 or not. It will also be 
interesting to investigate whether the banker behaves consistently throughout the various 
seasons, with regards to the generosity of offers made. 
The second dataset will be examined to ultimately answer the research question at hand. 
To do this, two models are developed to estimate the utility of wealth for any given contestant. 
From here, multiple risk coefficients can be produced to measure how risky gambling on would 
be at each banker offer. These risk coefficients vary in complexity and efficiency, with each 
being detailed thoroughly in the next section of this paper. 
An extensive list of additional variables will also be collected for each contestant (see 
Table 1). These variables are for the most part the values of the boxes opened by the 
contestants in their correct orders, as any analysis needs to be path-dependent. This should 
highlight any evidence of the altering of reference points, in line with prospect theory. From here, 
all absolute monetary values will be transformed so that the utilities of these amounts can be 
worked with. At each banker offer stage, the various models will reflect the risk of continuing on, 
using the variables at that particular point in time. The steps within this section will be carried out 
for all 20 contestants in this dataset. 
The analysis of the second dataset will comprise of two subsections. The first will look at 
the sample as a whole, investigating which contestants accept/reject the most/least risky 
gambles, according to the models and risk coefficients devised. The average round in which 
contestants choose to accept the banker offer will also be established, as well as the range of 
maximum risk coefficients associated with each contestant’s decision to not gamble further.  
                                                          
5 A random number generator was used to ensure that any findings of this paper could reasonably be 
generalised to the wider population. 
6 “Beating the banker” is a scenario in which a contestant accepts an offer from the banker of greater value 
than their box contents 
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The second subsection of the analysis will attempt to answer the research question. As 
the research question centres on behavioral inconsistencies in the losses and gains, these 
terms must be defined within the context of this study. The domain of losses will be 
characterized as seeing the banker offer reduce by a third or more from one round to the next. 
Similarly, the domain of gains will be characterized as seeing the banker offer increase by 50 
percent (or more) from one round to the next. The scenarios that fit these criteria will be 
investigated, to analyze the contestants’ decisions when facing gambles with the largest and 
smallest associated risk coefficients. These results will be compared with contestants’ decisions 
when facing gambles with similar risk coefficients, though are said to be operating outside of any 
particular domain by the definition outlined in this section. 
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Table 1 
Description of Additional Variables within the Detailed Dataset 
 
Variable Name Type Description 
Previous Contestant 
Winnings 
Float The amount won by the most recent 
contestant 
Female Binary Indicates contestant's gender 
B1 Float Value of box opened 1st 
B2 Float Value of box opened 2nd 
B3 Float Value of box opened 3rd 
B4 Float Value of box opened 4th 
B5 Float Value of box opened 5th 
B6 Float Value of box opened 6th 
B7 Float Value of box opened 7th 
B8 Float Value of box opened 8th 
B9 Float Value of box opened 9th 
B10 Float Value of box opened 10th 
B11 Float Value of box opened 11th 
B12 Float Value of box opened 12th 
B13 Float Value of box opened 13th 
B14 Float Value of box opened 14th 
B15 Float Value of box opened 15th 
B16 Float Value of box opened 16th 
B17 Float Value of box opened 17th 
B18 Float Value of box opened 18th 
B19 Float Value of box opened 19th 
B20 Float Value of box opened 20th 
B21 Float Value of box opened 21st 
BO1 Float Amount of 1st banker offer 
CD1 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 1st 
banker offer 
BO2 Float Amount of 2nd banker offer 
CD2 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 2nd 
banker offer 
BO3 Float Amount of 3rd banker offer 
CD3 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 3rd 
banker offer 
BO4 Float Amount of 4th banker offer 
CD4 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 4th 
banker offer 
BO5 Float Amount of 5th banker offer 
CD5 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 5th 
banker offer 
BO6 Float Amount of 6th banker offer 
CD6 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 6th 
banker offer 
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3.2 Models & Risk Coefficients 
To measure a contestant’s aversion to risk, an accurate and consistent measure of the 
riskiness of rejecting a banker offer in favor of gambling must be modelled. An extremely basic 
model might determine this risk coefficient to be simply a function of the banker offer (o) over the 
expected value of the boxes remaining (μ). 
𝑟1 =
𝑜
𝜋
 
This approach however uses absolute monetary values in the equation. As it is not the 
true amounts at stake that are considered by contestants but rather the utility these amounts 
provide, a transformation must be incorporated into the model before any evaluation of risk can 
take place. Intuitive thinking tells us that an extra unit of wealth provides less additional utility to 
a rich individual than to a poor individual. This law of diminishing marginal utility was considered 
by Daniel Bernoulli who hypothesized that the utility of wealth (u(x)) can be expressed as a 
logarithm of the absolute monetary value. 
𝑢(𝑥) = log 𝑥 
Contestants on Deal or No Deal can be assumed to gain more additional utility from 
£10,000 to £20,000 than from £100,000 to £110,000. Building on Bernoulli’s hypothesis, a 
transformation function f(x) might look as follows: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑘. ln(𝑥)𝑙 
Variables k and l are parameters and are arbitrary. Setting both to 4.1 produces the 
following curve: 
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With this transformation function, a new risk coefficient r2 can be developed that 
successfully incorporates the law of diminishing marginal utility. 
𝑟2 =
𝑓(𝑜)
𝑓(𝜇)
 
At larger amounts, the rate of change in f(o) and f(μ) decreases, and thus the incentive to 
gamble on also decreases, as contestants acknowledge that more utility can be lost from a 
decrease in some x than can be gained from an increase in the same x. This equation, whilst an 
improvement, still fails to model the evaluation of risk accurately under certain circumstances. 
For example, consider the following two choices: 
 50% chance of £90,000 and 50% chance of £110,000 OR £100,000 for sure (c1) 
 50% chance of nothing and 50% chance of £200,000 OR £100,000 for sure (c2) 
The expected value of both gambles is the same, and the banker offer is the same. As a 
result, the expected utilities are the same, and the respective r2 coefficients for each choice are 
identical, implying that each gamble is as risky as the other. Most people would disagree with 
this suggestion, arguing that choice 2 is considerably riskier than choice 1, as a result of the 
standard deviation (σ) about the mean being much larger. The reason an increase in σ of the 
remaining boxes leads to a perceived increase in risk could be due to the tendency for 
individuals to naturally be more sensitive to losses than to gains, and thus increasing the stakes 
would increase the risk. 
Whilst small losses have been shown to loom larger than small gains, larger amounts 
sees the effect exacerbated (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). As the pain of leaving with nothing in 
choice 2 would be much greater than the increase in utility that could be gained from an extra 
£100,000. It would thus be safer to accept the sure thing in this instance. In choice 1 however, 
the utility provided by the worst possible outcome (£90,000) might offset any negative feelings 
experienced by losing the gamble, and hence the gamble is more likely to be taken. Indeed, an 
individual with immense wealth might see both choices as trivial. For the purposes of this study 
however, contestants are assumed to be homogenous with regards to their utilities of wealth. 
To account for the effects a change in σ has on the evaluation of risk, a third risk 
coefficient r3 is defined as follows: 
𝑟3 =
𝑓(𝑜)
𝜎
𝜇⁄ . 𝑓(𝜇)
 
𝑟3 =
𝜇. 𝑓(𝑜)
𝜎. 𝑓(𝜇)
 
Incorporating the mean as a proportion of the standard deviation and multiplying this by 
f(μ) leads to a new risk coefficient that is altered by the spread of boxes still remaining in play. It 
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is important to note that this model, when applied to the two choice problems above, give a 
larger risk coefficient to choice 1 (10) than to choice 2 (1). This is due to the extreme values 
presented in the choices, to illustrate a previous point. Choice 1 gives 𝜎 𝜇⁄ = 0.1 which causes 
such a high r3, whereas in reality, 𝜎 𝜇⁄  is never that low. In our dataset, the lowest value is 0.25, 
and only in 15 of 120 instances are the values lower than 1. The trend generally is that this 
component shrinks in magnitude throughout a contestant’s game, leading to an enlarged 
(relatively speaking) r3 as time continues. Any analysis will consider this limitation when dealing 
with standard deviation-to-mean ratios lower than 1. 
Though f(x) more accurately reflects the utility of wealth than x, it has severe limitations 
when dealing with small amounts. Though what is defined as a small amount will in practice vary 
between contestants, a general assumption can be made that contestants arrive on the game 
show with some reference point r in their minds. The current model has the steepest gradient 
near the origin, implying this is where the most utility is gained for an increase in x. we would 
consider that amounts smaller than the reference point are underweighted, or 𝑢(𝑥) < 𝑥  for 𝑥 <
𝑟. At  r, the utility is accurately realized, or 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥 at 𝑥 = 𝑟. The utility at 𝑥 > 𝑟 can still be 
essentially modelled by f(x), only shifted horizontally by r and vertically by an arbitrary constant 
c. 
The new model g(x) can be defined as follows: 
𝑔(𝑥) = {
2𝑟𝑥3
(𝑥3−𝑥+2𝑟)3
} for 𝑥 ≤ 𝑟 
𝑔(𝑥) = {𝑘. ln(𝑥 − 𝑟)𝑙 + 𝑐} for 𝑥 > 𝑟 
Setting r to £10,000 seems like a reasonable reference point to define for any given 
contestant. This is due to numerous contestants stating their target amount of around this figure 
before the game has commenced, and the median prize money dealt to contestants from the 
general dataset being only slightly higher at £12,000. Setting c to 2000 prevents the gradient of 
the curve from increasing as x approaches £10,000, decreasing briefly from £10,000 to £11,000, 
before increasing again above £11,000, as there is no reason to assume that this would be the 
case. Keeping k and l at 4.1 produces the following plots: 
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When plotted on the same graph, the following curve is produced: 
 
Substituting f(x) for g(x) in r2 and r3 creates two new risk coefficients, r4 and r5. 
𝑟4 =
𝑔(𝑜)
𝑔(𝜇)
 
𝑟5 =
𝜇. 𝑔(𝑜)
𝜎. 𝑔(𝜇)
 
The notion of an increasingly risky game has not yet been incorporated into any models, 
besides the gradually decreasing 𝜎 𝜇⁄  (or increasing 
𝜇
𝜎⁄ ). As contestants are trying to avoid 
large values to maximise their offers and expected values, each low value box opened 
(relatively speaking) increases the chances of a high value box being opened next. 
Understanding the game in this way, the increased significance of later rounds is apparent, as 
there is a reduced chance of not finding the large values still left in play. 
The models created to measure risk therefore must incorporate the time-sensitivity of the 
banker offer. A new variable t can be defined to measure how many boxes have been opened. 
Dividing t by 22 and multiplying this by r3 and r57 ensures the risk coefficients in earlier rounds 
are smaller than their time-insensitive counterparts. These new models, r6 and r7, are formally 
defined as follows: 
𝑟6 =
𝑡. 𝜇. 𝑓(𝑜)
22. 𝜎. 𝑓(𝜇)
 
                                                          
7 Whilst one could multiply 𝑡 22⁄  by all the risk coefficients up to this point to generate new coefficients, this 
would not be useful as these coefficients were merely used to derive more complex models. 
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𝑟7 =
𝑡. 𝜇. 𝑔(𝑜)
22. 𝜎. 𝑔(𝜇)
 
The models developed in this section will be used to calculate a risk score at any banker 
offer of any contestant’s game. This will be used to provide a general overview of how risk-
seeking or risk-averse the individuals in the sample are, as well as to analyze any increased or 
decreased risk-seeking behavior following certain events within the game. 
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4. Analysis 
4.1 General Dataset Analysis 
Table 2 
Description of Variables within the General Dataset 
 
Variable Name Type Description 
ContestantNumber Integer Chronological ordering of contestants 
Dataset Integer 1 = general dataset, 2 = detailed dataset 
Series Integer The series in which the episode first aired 
EpisodeDate Date The date on which the episode first aired 
ContestantName String The contestant’s name 
PBA Float The amount in the contestant’s box 
MinOffer Float The minimum amount offered by the banker 
MaxOffer Float The maximum amount offered by the banker 
DealtWith Float The contestant’s eventual winnings 
DealtRed Binary Indicates whether winnings were at least 
£1000 
PlayedUntilEnd Binary Indicates whether contestant played until the 
end 
Swap8 Binary Indicates whether contestant chose to swap 
their box with the one box remaining upon 
reaching the end of their game 
BeatBanker Binary Indicates whether winnings were higher than 
PBA 
PerfectGame Binary Indicates whether contestant won the 
maximum amount possible from their game 
  
Table 2 lists the variables contained within the general dataset. Although this dataset 
cannot be analyzed to provide an answer to the research question, preliminary analysis can be 
conducted to give a general overview of how contestants generally fare on the game show. 
Summarising the key variables (all those beneath the break in Table 2) and establishing various 
means will provide a reference point to help further understand any deviations from these values 
in the detailed dataset in the next section. 
  
                                                          
8 Although some data for this variable has been collected by the author, the dataset’s lack of detail ensures it is 
not possible to identify occurrences of contestants choosing to swap and receiving less than their original box 
contents. For this reason, no extensive analysis is to be conducted on this variable. As a result, there are 
expected to be a few records that are erroneously coded as PlayedUntilEnd=0, though this is not expected to 
be a large number and thus not anticipated to hinder any analysis. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Key Variables within the General Dataset 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PBA 1686 24669.14 53768.92 .01 250000 
MinOffer 1686 2702.036 3375.875 -150 17500 
MaxOffer 1686 26953.94 25579.39 250 172000 
DealtWith 1686 15507.38 19617.08 .01 250000 
DealtRed 1686 .8084223 .3936592 0 1 
BeatBanker 1686 .4744958 .4994973 0 1 
PerfectGame 1686 .2390273 .426616 0 1 
 
The mean value contained with a contestant box was £24,669.14 over this period, whilst 
the average amount dealt to contestants was £15,507.38. Whilst this divide may initially appear 
to suggest that contestants often settle for considerably less than their box contains, the table 
also reveals that over 47% of contestants beat the banker during their games. The reason for 
this considerable divide is due to the fixed box values increasing exponentially, distorting the 
analysis and reducing the significance of using means. More useful is to look at the median 
values, to know where 50% of the sample lies below and above, with regards to the player’s box 
amount and eventual winnings. 
Table 4 
Detailed Summary of the PBA and DealtWith Variables 
 
Percentiles 
% PBA DealtWith 
1% 0.01 0.01 
5% 0.1 1 
10% .5 20 
25% 10 3000 
50% 750 12000 
75% 20000 20000 
90% 75000 30000 
95% 100000 44000 
99% 250000 88000 
 
Looking at the medians as opposed to the means tells a different story. In Table 4 it can 
be seen that 50% of contestants had £750 or less in their box (as expected), yet 50% of 
contestants won up to £12,000. Of these, half won at least £3000. At the other end of the scale, 
10% of contestants had at least £75,000 in their box whereas only 5% won more than £44,000, 
with just 1% winning more than £88,000. 
Examining only those contestants who beat the banker reveals that when this occurs, it is 
often quite a substantial gain. Table 4 shows that in over 96% of cases, the contestant won 
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more than £1000, and the average winnings were nearly £18,000. This is compared with an 
average box value of little over £2500. As before, an examination of the median values should 
also be conducted for clarity. 
Table 5 
Summary of a Subset of Key Variables for BeatBanker = 1 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PBA 800 2597.436 7355.923 0.01 100000 
DealtWith 800 17823.62 16821.97 0.04 250000 
DealtRed 800 0.96125 0.193119 0 1 
PerfectGame 800 0.40875 0.491911 0 1 
 
Table 6 
Detailed Summary of the PBA and DealtWith Variables for BeatBanker = 1 
 
Percentiles 
% PBA DealtWith 
1% 0.01 15.5 
5% 0.01 1100 
10% 0.1 3557.5 
25% 1 8000 
50% 100 15000 
75% 1000 22475 
90% 10000 31837.5 
95% 15000 42000 
99% 35000 80500 
 
As displayed by Table 6, the values at the various percentiles support the arguments 
made by the mean values in Table 4. 75% of contestants who beat the banker had less than 
£1000 in their box, yet 95% left with more than £1100 in prize money. 
Although analysis shows that contestants who beat the banker normally do very well, 
these individuals are just under half of the entire sample. Table 7 shows that the 478 
contestants who won less than their box value received an average prize of just over £16,000. 
Although this figure is considerably less than the average PBA of nearly £75,000, it again must 
be noted that this figure may be distorted by the extremely high box values of a few contestants. 
Table 8 examines the values at various percentiles. 
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Table 7 
Summary of a Subset of Key Variables for DealtWith < PBA 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PBA 478 74405.93 77482.38 0.1 250000 
DealtWith 478 16607.46 14687.31 0.01 107031 
 
Table 8 
Detailed Summary of the PBA and DealtWith Variables for DealtWith < PBA 
 
Percentiles 
% PBA DealtWith 
1% 1 0.01 
5% 1000 9 
10% 5000 750 
25% 20000 6600 
50% 50000 15000 
75% 100000 22000 
90% 250000 30000 
95% 250000 44000 
99% 250000 75000 
 
50% of this subset may have been disappointed to discover their box contained more 
than £50,000. However, 75% still left with over £6600, and 50% left with over £15,000. Based on 
this data, although a significant decrease in prize money in real monetary terms is apparent for 
many contestants, the law of diminishing marginal utility ensures that many contestants would 
not be as disheartened as may have been expected. 
It can be argued then, that accepting a banker offer, regardless of the ultimate box value, 
may not leave a contestant particularly susceptible to negative emotions following a game, if the 
amount dealt at provides a significant increase in utility. Many contestants may reach a point in 
which they know that the utility gained from accepting an offer will offset any amount of utility 
perceived to have been ‘lost’ by ultimately having a much higher amount in their box. 
From this, it can be deduced that only the most risk-seeking contestants choose to play 
to the end, in an effort to maximize their utility by trying to win the highest amount possible9. 
These contestants’ averages are detailed in Table 9. The average prize of over £18,400 may 
seem to imply that playing until the end of the game is a wise thing to do. However, the table 
                                                          
9 This section refers to a contestant who continuously rejects offers deemed to provide significant utility, based 
on the transformation model g(x) defined in section 3. A contestant that never has an offer of greater than 
£10,000 would not fit these criteria. 
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also shows that at least one individual won the largest prize of £250,000, and virtually half of this 
subset left with under £1000. The values at various percentiles are described in Table 10. 
Table 9 
Summary of a Subset of Key Variables for PlayedUntilEnd = 1 & MaxOffer > 10000 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PBA 246 15077.6 34630.89 0.01 250000 
DealtWith 246 18422.7 38595.44 0.01 250000 
DealtRed 246 0.5325203 0.4999585 0 1 
 
Table 10 
Detailed Summary DealtWith Variable for PlayedUntilEnd = 1 & MaxOffer > 10000 
 
Percentiles 
% DealtWith 
1% 0.01 
5% 0.01 
10% 0.5 
25% 10 
50% 3000 
75% 20000 
90% 50000 
95% 76000 
99% 250000 
 
As suspected, the mean is again a misleading statistic, with 75% of individuals who 
choose to play to the end receiving less than £20,000. Perhaps more concerning for risk-
seeking contestants is that half of this group wins £3000 or less; amounts providing very little 
utility according to our model g(x), and highly unlikely to offset any utility potentially lost by 
setting up a new reference point at the highest offer received. Although large amounts can be 
won by playing until the end, larger amounts are won more frequently by contestants who 
choose to deal, as detailed by Table 11. 
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Table 11 
Detailed Summary of the DealtWith Variable for MaxOffer > 10000 by PlayedUntilEnd 
 
DealtWith 
% PlayedUntilEnd = 0 PlayedUntilEnd = 1 
1% 0.26 0.01 
5% 1100 0.01 
10% 5000 0.5 
25% 10000 10 
50% 16500 3000 
75% 24000 20000 
90% 32000 50000 
95% 42000 76000 
99% 75000 250000 
Max 110000 250000 
 
The central 50% of those who choose to deal are considerably better off than their 
counterparts that elect to play until the end, accepting offers between £10,000 and £24,000. 
Those in this range who choose to gamble win between £10 and £20,000. The bottom 10% of 
the first group are also better off, accepting offers of up to £5000, compared to those in the 
second group who find a maximum of 50p in their boxes. The only percentile of contestants in 
the second group who win more than their group one counterparts are those in the top 10%, 
who luckily open their box to find values between £50,000 and £250,000. The top 10% of banker 
offers that are accepted, meanwhile, range from between £33,000 and £110,000. 
 
4.2. Detailed Dataset Analysis 
As the r7 model can be taken to be the most sophisticated measure of risk developed in 
this study, this is the metric we shall use throughout this section of the analysis. As such, we 
shall continue by using simply the notation r. 
Comparing the largest risk coefficients associated with rejected banker offers by each 
contestant should give some indication as to how risk-seeking each contestant is. However, this 
will only reveal that a contestant’s the tipping point10 r is larger than this value. It is more useful 
to show these values alongside the r coefficient of the offer the contestant ultimately accepted, 
to display the bounds between which a contestant’s tipping point exists. This is of course not 
possible for the contestants who chose to play until the end. Table 12 displays the results. 
  
                                                          
10 Tipping point refers to the r coefficient that would lead to a contestant switching from “no deal” to “deal”. 
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Table 12  
Comparing the largest risk coefficients associated with rejected banker offers 
 
Contestant Number Obs Max r Deal r 
1 4 0.161805 0.181889 
2 4 0.146163 0.070935 
3 4 0.205801 0.285477 
4 5 0.252832 0.509325 
5 4 0.247141 0.317983 
6 4 0.227189 0.232664 
7 4 0.08178 0.163035 
8 4 0.019661 0.216087 
9 6 0.061469 N/A 
10 6 0.350167 N/A 
11 5 0.216245 2.727273 
12 6 1.330767 N/A 
13 6 0.637755 N/A 
14 3 0.071456 0.118678 
15 2 0.062228 0.106933 
16 4 0.085566 0.17772 
17 4 0.083327 0.260924 
18 2 0.054084 0.079511 
19 4 0.03801 0.478981 
20 6 0.137844 N/A 
 
According to the data here, contestants 12 and 13 are the most risk-seeking. Both 
contestants played until the end, though with different results, winning £250 and £35,000 
respectively. When contestant 12 was facing the final offer with an r coefficient of 1.330767, the 
maximum that could be won was £250, and the minimum was £100. With this in mind, it is 
perhaps not so surprising that the contestant chose to gamble, and we should be cautious when 
stating that contestant 12 is the most risk-seeking of all the contestants. Contestant 13 
meanwhile saw an ever-increasing list of offers that led to the final offer of £16,000. The 
remaining boxes contained £3000 and £35,000, and as such choosing to gamble can be seen 
as risk-seeking behavior, given the non-linear nature of the utility function. 
It is interesting that contestant 2 changes their risk preferences from one round to the 
next, based on our models. This could be due to initially taking a risk that would be outside their 
typical preferences, and following this round made a decision deemed to be more comfortable to 
them. 
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On the other end of the scale, the contestants deemed to be the most risk-averse are 
contestants 15 and 18. As well as dealing at the third offer, they also rejected gambles with a 
relatively low r coefficient. This could however be due to other reasons, such as having prior 
expectations or aims and sticking to them. 
A look at the amount offered by the banker shows that on average banker offers increase 
as time goes on. Furthermore, the offers also increase as a percentage of the expected value of 
the contestant’s box. As discussed by a previous paper the ‘unfair’ banker offers at earlier 
rounds could be to deter contestants from dealing too early, with offers becoming increasingly 
more generous as time goes on (Post et. al, 2008). The standard deviation of banker offers 
however increases considerably between offers 2 and 3, before becoming extremely large at 
offer 6. This suggests that although the average values offered are increasing, there is also an 
increasingly wider range of values from which the banker can make an offer. 
Table 13 
Summary of Banker Offers by Round 
 
 Banker Offer Banker Offer as % of 
Expected Value 
Off Num Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
1 20 5939.05 3979 500 13000 23.79 13.4 3.1 46.4 
2 20 9040 4596 250 15000 36.31 17.1 2.8 67.6 
3 20 10093.25 7262 15 30000 40.10 19 0.1 90 
4 20 12270.75 8348 200 33000 46.88 19.9 6.26 90.1 
5 20 13627.55 9095 600 35000 58.78 19.4 26.9 89.2 
6 20 20420.89 31130 0.13 101000 72.56 20.5 32 100 
 
Switching focus over to only those individuals deemed to be operating the domains of 
losses and gains (DoG/L) enables us to attempt to answer the research question. Due to each 
contestant only being able to deal once in a game, it isn’t possible to say whether or not an 
individual operating in either domain is more or less risk-averse than they would be if they were 
operating normally11. It is possible however to study the r coefficient of gambles in different 
domains, and to analyze contestant decisions. Comparing these decisions with those made by 
contestants operating normally though facing similar prospects may lend credence to the 
argument that contestants are behaving in line with the predictions of prospect theory. 
As defined previously, a contestant is said to be operating in the DoL if their current offer 
is worth no more than two-thirds of the previous offer. Likewise, the DoG is defined by seeing 
the offer increase by a minimum of 50% of the previous offer. This analysis will use the utilities 
of the banker offers as opposed to the absolute values, in line with the literature and arguments 
                                                          
11 ‘Normally’, in this context, refers to an individual not said to be operating in the domain of losses or gains. 
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already made. A summary of banker offers and contestant decisions by domain is described by 
Table 14. 
 
 
The table displays a reduced proportion of individuals in the domains of gains and losses 
choosing to deal, relative to their normal counterparts. On average however, the banker offer 
was significantly lower than for normal individuals in these two domains, at two thirds the value 
in the DoG and one third the value in the DoL. As the utility gained from amounts under £10,000 
is underweighted, it would be useful to see the same table for only offers of over this figure. This 
data is described by Table 15. 
Table 15 
Banker Offer & Contestant Decisions by Domain for Offer >= 10000 
 
 Normal Domain of Gains Domain of Losses  
Offer Decision Offer Decision Offer Decision 
Obs 18 18 25 25 5 5 
Mean 20162.67 0.388889 15474.6 0.16 12700 0.2 
Std. Dev 15507.87 0.501631 4512.721 0.374166 3734.97 0.447214 
Min 10000 0 10000 0 10000 0 
Max 75000 1 30000 1 17500 1 
 
Again, fewer contestants choose to deal when operating the domains of losses and 
gains, though this should come as a surprise seeing as the banker offers are lower on average. 
As such, there is not enough evidence from this table to suggest an increase or decrease in risk 
aversion when operating in either domain. Furthermore, it is hard to draw any real conclusions 
about contestants operating in the domain of losses as the sample size of 5 is far too small. 
As such, redefining the DoL may be necessary. The current definition compares the 
utilities of the current offer with the previous offer, implying any offers prior to that are not 
factored into a contestant’s perception of their domain. It could be argued that a contestant 
would set their reference point at the highest offer received so far, and compare their current 
Table 14 
Banker Offers & Contestant Decisions by Domain 
 
 Normal Domain of Gains Domain of Losses  
Offer Decision Offer Decision Offer Decision 
Obs 27 27 55.00 55.00 20 20 
Mean 15010.3 0.2592593 9980.35 0.09 4815.75 0.15 
St. Dev. 14703.59 0.4465761 6165.27 0.29 5465.832 0.366348 
Min 700 0 500 0 15 0 
Max 75000 1 30000 1 17500 1 
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offer with that. We will maintain that to be classed as the DoL the current offer must be a 
maximum of two-thirds the value of the largest offer so far. Using this definition of DoL, Table 16 
looks at banker offers, means and r coefficients for contestants who chose not to deal, by their 
respective domains. 
Table 16 
Banker Offer, Means & r-coefficients for Deal = 0 by Domain 
 
 Normal Domain of Gains Domain of Losses 
 Offer Mean r Offer Mean r Offer Mean r 
Obs 19 19 19 43 43 43 25 25 25 
Mean 11488.3 29386.9 0.06 10327.16 26053.17 0.07 3936.64 12565.73 0.09 
Std. Dev 9108.2 13271.6 0.09 5864.86 10295.06 0.12 4127.27 10495.51 0.26 
Min 700 10921.3 <0.01 500 11377.83 <0.01 15 175 <0.01 
Max 35000 60650.2 0.25 30000 50005 0.64 17500 36170.01 1.33 
 Offer as % of Mean Offer as % of Mean Offer as % of Mean 
Obs 19  43   25  
Mean 36.81  40.47   35.79  
Std. Dev 23.67  18.03   21.55  
Min 5.01  3.13   0.05  
Max 90.05  84.21   85.71  
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Here we see similar average r values, largest in the DoL. The r value in the DoG is slightly 
smaller, though is still larger than the values for contestants in neither domain. This implies that 
contestants in the DoG or losses on average accept more risky gambles than their normally-
operating counterparts, with the results strongest in the DoL. Furthermore, the most risky 
gamble accepted by contestants in the normal domain had an r coefficient of 0.25, compared 
with values of 0.64 and 1.33 for contestants in the domains of gains and losses, respectively. If 
the ‘fairness’ of the banker offer is modelled as being a percentage of the expected value of the 
contestant’s box, there is no real difference between the different domains, and in fact the 
banker’s offers are slightly fairer in the Domain of Gains. 
Switching our attention to the instances in which contestants choose to deal, as 
displayed by Table 17, we can see that it takes a much fairer offer on average to entice the 
contestant in the DoL to deal, and the average r coefficient for gambles considered too risky to 
continue were higher for the DoL and gains, with the case much more pronounced in the domain 
of losses. It is of course an important limitation of this study that these sample sizes are small 
and limited to a particular environment, prompting further research in the area. 
 
Table 17 
Banker Offer, Means & r-coefficients for Deal = 1 by Domain 
 
 Normal Domain of Gains Domain of Losses 
 Offer Mean r Offer Mean r Offer Mean r 
Obs 7 7 7 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Mean 26357.14 49304.84 0.23 18125 33211.03 0.28 8187.5 13306.3 0.8 
Std. 
Dev 
21734.6 35784.49 0.15 3424.79 14650.72 0.13 6440.03 10959.18 1.29 
Min 14000 22020.22 0.08 15000 21010 0.18 750 750 0.07 
Max 75000 126500 0.51 23000 53201.1 0.48 16000 24013 2.73 
 Offer as % of Mean Offer as % of Mean Offer as % of Mean 
Obs 7 4 4 
Mean 55.87 59.41 73.25 
Std. 
Dev 
20.46 16.64 21.75 
Min 33.61 43.23 48.08 
Max 88.3 80.91 100 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
By analyzing contestants’ decisions when operating in the domains of losses and gains 
this paper can conclude that there is evidence to suggest an increase in risk-seeking behavior 
when operating in both domains.  This is most notably the case when the reference point is 
estimated to be equal to the highest offer received up to that point. Under this definition, 
contestants are observed to accept riskier gambles when in the domain of losses than non-DoL 
contestants, and also require a fairer banker offer to entice them to deal. This is in line with the 
findings of other Deal or No Deal studies (Post et al, 2013), and contradicts prospect theory’s 
prediction of increased risk aversion in the domain of gains. 
This paper contributes to the field of behavioral economics observing evidence of 
inconsistent risk preferences among individuals when faced with uncertain prospects. Further 
study into this area may reinforce the findings of this paper, and due to the ease of access to 
data and the ideal format of the game is greatly encouraged. This perhaps could include the 
overweighting and underweighting of low and high probabilities as described by a more recent 
development on prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1993).  
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APPENDIX 
A. Box Values 
The 22 fixed prizes in Deal or No Deal (UK) are shown below in a similar style to that shown within the 
program. Red values indicate the largest 50%, whilst blue values indicate the smallest 50%. 
1p £1,000 
10p £3,000 
50p £5,000 
£1 £10,000 
£5 £15,000 
£10 £20,000 
£50 £35,000 
£100 £50,000 
£250 £75,000 
£500 £100,000 
£750 £250,000 
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B. Data 
An example of some of the information collected about a contestant in the detailed dataset: 
 
 
t Box Opened Value Eliminated (VE)f(VE) g(VE) Total Prize Remaining (TPR)
0 565666.61
1 B1 15000.00 43956.70 40207.54 550666.61
2 B2 0.01 #NUM! 0.00 550666.60
3 B3 1000.00 11325.71 2.92 549666.60
4 B4 1.00 0.00 0.00 549665.60
5 B5 75000.00 82906.10 118960.65 474665.60
6 B6 10000.00 36839.54 10000.00 464665.60
7 B7 0.50 #NUM! 0.00 464665.10
8 B8 20000.00 49603.84 55279.55 444665.10
9 B9 250.00 4520.70 0.04 444415.10
10 B10 50.00 1100.60 0.00 444365.10
11 B11 5.00 28.85 0.00 444360.10
12 B12 5000.00 26730.03 714.29 439360.10
13 B13 50000.00 71298.29 98683.59 389360.10
14 B14 100000.00 91969.79 134269.27 289360.10
15 B15 750.00 9513.08 1.18 288610.10
16 B16 35000.00 62142.96 81728.78 253610.10
17 B17 10.00 125.28 0.00 253600.10
18 B18 3000.00 20742.90 109.31 250600.10
19 B19 500.00 7341.42 0.34 250100.10
20 B20 100.00 2148.28 0.00 250000.10
21 B21 250000.00 125893.47 189803.10 0.10
